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IN A SPEECH PREPARED FOR SENATE DELIVERY BUT WHICH HE MADE
AVAILABLE TODAY, FRIDAY, APRIL~ SENATOR MANSFIELD
(D., MONTANA) SAID:
--Mr. President: The opposition to the nationalist government of YfJoD~
which has never ceased in underground conspiracy and sabotage has now
come out in an open military action designed to destroy that government.
There has already been considerable fighting and bloodsh e d in the streets
of Saigon.
For a time the Viet Namese government appeared to be making
some progress in consolidating the non - communist position in south Viet
Nam.

Headed by Ngo Dien Diem, that government has had the full coopera-

tion of the United States.
The Diem government made clear from its inception that it was
dedicated to the independence and welfare of the people of Viet Nam.
Because it was, it antagonized powerful forces, native and otherwise,
in Saigon-Cholon.

For the first time, the Viet Minh communist forces

in the north found themselves confronted with an opposition which had
some chance of capturing the loyalties of the Viet Namese people which
they had monopolized by default prior to its advent.
As members of the Senate may recall, I have visited Viet Nam
during the course of two study missions in Indochina and have reported
my observations to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I have also

spoken on the situation in Indochina from time to time in this body.
I have not been in Viet Nam since last September, and I do not
know the full details of

th~

present crisis.

I assume that the President

D~

- 2 and the Secretary of State do have tl1osc details since they bear reaponsibihty
{or fitting our policy to developments in Viet Nam.
Recent news reports from Saigon and

clsewh~rc,

hOWC\'Cr. do nive

a general picture of what has been going on in south Viet Nam.

They tell

of French dissatisfaction with the Diem government and the bitter animosity
of various sects and other groups towards that government because of its
attempts to curtail their independent power and revenue.

The Diem govern-

ment has been portrayed for weeks as on the verge of overthrow, with its
Premier unable to consolidate his authority in the country.
They also tell of the incredibly sordid situation which the nationalist
government inherited after the Geneva truce,

They tell of the near-anarchy in

the south and the callous corruption in Saigon.

They do not tell of the constant

efforts to undercut the government by an under-cover conspiracy that operates
back and forth between the French Riviera and the city of Saigon-Cholon.
Now that conspiracy has finally come out in the open.

\'.'e see the

incredible spectacle of the .?remier of the Government, Ngo Dien Diem, being
summoned to Paris in the midst of a revolt precipitated by racketeers.

We se<

the incredible spectacle of a military leader who had sought refuge a1:1ong the
racketeers being appointed by a Chief of State in Cannes over the head of the
premier as commander of the national army which is supposed to suppress
the racketeer 1 s revolt .
There is nothing new in this picture, except the open fighting.

It is pre-

cisely the kind of situation with which the Diem government has had to contend
since the outset,
t:luo\""'~

There is nothing in it which would lead me to revise the con-

which l reacheti

l~r~

vear.

:)r.

Oct"l--" -

1c~'h

!. reportt>d th,..-;e c-onclu-
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sions to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I should like to re-emphasize

them at this time by reading pertinent: sections:
A year ago, the principal requirements for the
success of our policy with respect to Indochina were political.
These requirements, full independence and effective internal
goverment, notably in Vietnam, have not been effectively
fulfilled. The failure in this respect appears also to have been
accompanied by a consistent underestimating of both the political
and military strength of the Vietminh, on the part of practically
all concerned. In consequence, the situation has seriously
deteriorated.
The United States shares responsibility for the reversal in Indochina. We should not make the mistake, however,
of assuming all the blame. We gave material aid unstintingly,
but its value was dissipated by inadequacies elsewhere . I
report this, not so much in criticism-- I am fully aware of the
great contributions to the common cause made by sincere French
officials and sincere Vietnamese nationalists- -but rather to make
clear that this country has discharged the commitments which it
was asked to make last year and which it agreed to make. At
that time it was not asked to commit and was even discouraged
from committing manpower in Indochina. Not until the crisis
of Dien Bien Phu did the question even arise. Then the pressures of American opinion operating largely through Congress
discouraged a hasty, ill-conceived involvement. Our share in
the defense of Indochina was clearly understood at the outset to
be the supply of material aid only and we quite properly insisted
that this understanding be maintained. The situation in Indochina is only one of the many crises that confront us and the
burden of sustaining freedom in the world must be equitably
borne.
At present, there appears to be, at best, scant hope of
achieving the objectives of our policy in Indochina in the near
future, with Cambodia the only exception to this conclusion. The
present Government of Vietnarr. which is based on the sound
principles of national independence, an end to corruption and
internal amelioration, is immobilized largely by a squabbling
plotting opposition. Its crltics complain of the personality of
the leader of that Government. In view of the numerous and

-4vaned personahties who have occup1ed the Pre 1d ncy 1n
Sa1gon during the past Z or 3 years w1thout tnng1ble result ,
1t seems more hkely that the real question 1s one of
dusntisfact1on w1th the prmc1plcs of the D1em government
rather than the inadcquac1es of hlS pcrsonahty.

Should the D1em government be forced out of ofhcc, 1t
1s doubtful that under the pressure of t1me a more sau&fnctory,
subst1tute, subscribmg to the same principles to wh1ch he docs,
w1ll be :found. Yet these pr1nc1ples must preva1l 1n south
Vietnam , if an alternative to the Communist V1etmmh tltat 11
likely to be acceptable to the people of Vietnam 1s to exist
Any replacement of D:em at this time, if it occurs, will
probably take the form of a military dictatorship based upon
a coalition of the special interests, pa1·tics, and groups which
now oppose the present Government. It is improbable that
the sub£ltitute will be the ktnd of government which w1ll be
generally supported by the Vietnamese people any more than
the pre-Diem governments were. Nor is it likely to be a
government capable of sustaining a free and independent
Vietnam eventually without fore1gn support. It was to develop
that kind of Vietnam that the United States made available
hundreds of millions of dollars of a1d. In my view, only that
kind of Vietna:n can achieve the purpose of our policy in
Indochina which, in the final analysis, is its freedom and the
conscquont enhancement of our own security.
In the event that the Diem government falls, therefore,
I believe that the Umted States shot:ld considct· an immediate
suspenston of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces
there, except that uf a humanitarian nature, preliminary to a
complete reappraisal of our present policies in F~ce Vietnam.
Unless there is reasonable expectation of fulfilling our objectives the continued expcndi ture of the resources of the citizens
of the United States is unwarranted and inexcusable.
Two parts of those conclusions should be underlined in connection
with the presP.nt r:risis.

They bear directly on it.
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1. Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it is
doubtful that a more satisfactory substitute subscribing to the
same principles which he does, will be found. Yet those
principles must prevail in south Vietnam, if an alternative
to the Communist Vietminh that is likely to be acceptable to
the people of Vietnam is to exist.
and
2. In the event that the Diem Government falls, I believe
that the United States should consider an immediate suspension of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces
there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to
a complete reappraisal of our present policies in Free
Vietnam.
A showdown in Saigon is now in progress.
side issues in this struggle,

I know that there are

I know that it has been contended and perhaps

correctly that Diem is too uncompromising in his dealings with other
political leaders who are inclined towards the nationalist cause,

Basically,

however, the showdown is between two sets of forces in VietNam.

The

one, presently personified by Diem, stands for a decent and honest government in an independent VietNam.

The military power aligned against it is

based on those who have little concept of, little concern, or downright contempt for what these terms mean.

Diem has recently expressed his intention

of holding elections as a first step towards representative government.
opposes these elections?

Who

Those, apparently, whose power is not based on the

consent of the people over whom it is exercised.

The opponents of the Diem

government have power but it is a power built largely on corruption and the
fear that their private armed forces inspire.
the pirate,

th~

It is the power of the Black Band,

mercenary, the racketeer, and the witch doctor.

-6l£ the

torccs stand1ng !or decency and honesty and genumc

nattonal independence !ail tn thie crlSu;, the cause of human freedom 1n
Asia will not ga1n.
gain.

This country w1ll not gain.

France wtll not really

Even those V1etnamese who help to bring about the downfall of

the government, in the long run, wtll not gam.

Only the Commumsts w1ll

gain.
It is possible that a semblance o! stabil1ty may be produced in

Saigon i! a coalition of the corrupt under a thin veneer of
replaces the present government.

1

cspectability

Beneath the surface, however, the

penetration of communism will go on inevitably.
My view of the present crisis remains as I expressed it in the
conclusions of the report which I read today .

Current developments

seem to me only to emphasize the pertinence of those conclusions.
It is possible that the Executive Branch has information on the
situation in south VietNam going far beyond that which 1s currently
appearing in the press.

General Collins, who has been doing a

difficult job with superb devotion to duty, in support of the Diem government,
has just reported to the President and the Secretary of State.

It may be

that in time this body will be advised of facts which we do not now have.
It may be that the President and the Secretary of State will find it

neces,:ar)' to alter the present direction of our policy in Viet N<!m.
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That is entirely possible and, if it is the case, it certainly lies
within their responsibility to make the necessary adjustments.

I am

confident, however, that this government will not align itself with the kind of
forces which are now in r.1ilitary and conspiratorial opposition to Diem.
The expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars in support of those forces
would be, it seems to me, entirely unwarranted,

I believe the American

people would expect an explanation which will show how any such expenditures
could contribute to the national interests of this country.
responsibility of the Congress to see that they get it.

It would be the

Our national interests

with respect to VietNam can be furthered only if our policies serve to lead
to a VietNamese government which is independent and which can put down
solid roots in the VietNamese populace.

